The Shape of Things to Come: Cylinder vs. Tree

2023-05-15 metaphysics causality Paul Ritterbush

In the previous article, I presented the difference between indeterminism and determinism by whether or not duplicated things become different from one another. If the universe is indeterminiate, then this is to say there are things that, if duplicated, can diverge from their originals. This is about as good as we can get from a practical standpoint. We don’t need to duplicate the entire universe, we just need to duplicate some things in it. Continue reading

Deterministic Watches and Indeterministic Watches

2023-02-02 metaphysics causality Paul Ritterbush

Are most people determinists? Determinism seems to be a default view of the world. It’s insanity to repeat the same thing and expect a different result. Right? In a world of computers, cars, rockets, etc. Yes. The same action always produces the same result. Unless … Unless the computer glitches. Unless the car fails to start. Unless the rocket explodes. Unless … . Unless all sorts of mechanical problems. And unless there’s an element of indeterminism. Continue reading

Gettier's Cases Are Not Counterexamples to Justified True Belief Accounts of Knowledge

2020-12-15 epistemology belief logic gettier Paul Ritterbush

Gettier is widely considered to have falsified justified true belief accounts of knowledge. In this paper, I show that the subjects of Gettier’s cases cannot believe what Gettier claims they believe, given a reasonable proposal for how to characterize belief using propositions and the tools of truth functional logic. Furthermore, no alternative characterization would seem to be forthcoming. However, even if an alternative were available in line with what Gettier claims the subjects believe, I show that it would render the beliefs unjustified, since the subjects would not be able to tell why they believe what they do. Because of this, Gettier’s cases entirely fail against justified true belief accounts of knowledge, despite what has been widely believed for over a half a century.

Does Gettier Provide Counterexamples to Justified True Belief Accounts of Knowledge?

2020-06-09 epistemology belief logic gettier Paul Ritterbush

Gettier is widely considered to have falsified justified true belief accounts of knowledge. In this paper, I provide clear proofs that show that the subjects of Gettier’s cases cannot believe what Gettier claims they believe. To do this, I clarify how we are to characterize belief using propositions and the tools of truth functional logic. Furthermore, no alternative characterization would seem to be forthcoming. Because of this, Gettier’s cases entirely fail against justified true belief accounts of knowledge, despite what has been widely believed for over a half a century.